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Abstract
The paper examines the determinants of income and wealth inequality in a
Kaldorian model where the profit share adjusts to clear the goods market and the
long-run output-capital ratio is constant. The approach is radically different from
both the mainstream approach that stresses properties of production function and
the Kaleckian approach that emphasizes the long-run adjustment of utilization.
The Kaldorian model is used to identify several developments that may have
caused increasing inequality in income and wealth since the early 1980s, including
the shift of the power relation in corporate firms in favor of top managerial pay,
the decline in the retention rate, increasing share buybacks, rising indebtedness of
lower-income households, and the stock market boom in the 1990s. In contrast to
Piketty’s explanation, the decline in the natural rate of growth reduces inequality
of income and wealth in this Kaldorian framework.
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1 Introduction
Increasing inequality in income and wealth since the 1980s has attracted a great deal
of attention recently. In particular, Piketty and his colleagues have made impressive
contributions to the empirical literature on inequality (Piketty and Saez, 2003, Alvaredo
et al., 2014, Piketty, 2014b, Piketty and Zucman, 2014). The interpretation of the
empirical findings, however, is not straightforward and Piketty’s own explanation based
on the Solow-Swan model has been contested1.
This paper presents an alternative explanation from a Kaldorian perspective re-
garding increasing inequality in the US since the early 1980s. In so doing, I extend the
Kaldor/Pasinetti model (Kaldor, 1955/56, 1966, Pasinetti, 1962) to include financial
stocks and two social classes in a stock-flow consistent model of a corporate economy.
Based on the extended Kaldorian model, I analyze how the steady-state income and
wealth shares are affected by structural/behavioral parameters, including the shift in
the power relation in corporate firms in favor of top managerial pay, financial changes
such as the fall in the retention rate of and increasing share buybacks by corpora-
tions, increasing indebtedness of lower-income households, the stock market boom in
the 1990s and the decline in the natural rate of growth. This analysis suggests that all
of these developments – except the last – increase income and wealth inequality in this
Kaldorian model. The model developed here has the following key features:
First, the functional distribution of income – the profit share – is determined en-
dogenously by the state of aggregate demand: favorable demand conditions in the
goods market allow firms to achieve higher profit margins under nominal wage con-
tracts. My approach takes the functional distribution of income (the profit share) as
a key endogenous variable, which is determined through the goods-market equilibrium
process. The approach therefore is distinguished from that found in the burgeoning
literature on wage-led/profit-led growth (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990, Blecker, 2002,
Lavoie and Stockhammer, 2013, Stockhammer and Onaran, 2013) which, typically in
Kaleckian models, examines whether a parametric change in the profit share increases
or decreases economic performance (growth and utilization rates).2
Second, the model assumes an exogenous long-run output-capital ratio as an ap-
proximation of its insensitivity to variations in endogenous forces (e.g., factor prices,
demand conditions). The assumption of the insensitivity of the output-capital ratio is
1One may notice that there is an ambiguity regarding how important Piketty’s explanation based
on the properties of production function (e.g. the elasticity of factor substitution ) is in understanding
his empirical account. Piketty’s own position appears to have swung and he recently reduced his
emphasis on the neoclassical explanation: ‘Let me make clear however this [= the explanation of
income distribution based on the degree of factor substitution] is not my favored interpretation of the
evidence.’ (Piketty, 2014a)[p.9]
2Some Kaleckian models introduce endogenous changes in mark-ups. Marglin and Bhaduri (1990),
for instance, adopt flexible mark-ups and Dutt (1984) takes the mark-up as a state variable the
evolution of which depends on the growth rate of capital.
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linked to two arguments: (i) capital/labor factor substitutability is limited3 and (ii) the
economy operates on average at the desired rate of utilization in the long run (Harrod,
1939).4 This feature distinguishes my approach from both Piketty’s explanation (that
emphasizes strong factor substitution) and the Kaleckian approach (that stresses the
endogenous adjustment of capacity utilization even in the long run).
Third, I assume that households are divided into two classes as in many post Key-
nesian models, but the framework in this paper is more general. In the model with two
financial assets (corporate shares and deposits), the two classes both own shares and
deposits, and receive wages, dividends and interest income. The explicit introduction of
financial assets avoids a pitfall of the conflation of financial wealth and (reproducible)
physical capital.5 The framework allows the study of share ownership and wealth dis-
tribution. Pasinetti (1962) is an early study that introduces the dynamics of asset
ownership into a two-class Cambridge model.6 A Classical/Marxian model with vary-
ing asset ownership is offered by Michl and Foley (2004) and Kaleckian versions by
Dutt (1990), Palley (2005, 2012) and Taylor (2014). In contrast, the present paper
examines the issues of equity ownership/wealth distribution in a mature economy using
a Kaldorian framework.
Last but not least, I treat labor income for the upper-class households (mostly
CEO/managerial pay) as a deduction from profits rather than a deduction from the total
wage bill. This approach thus expands the definition of profits to include CEO/managerial
pay.7 The perspective of top management pay as an allocation of profits dates back
at least to Marx (1984)[ch 23] and Kalecki (1938)[p.97], but a clear statement of the
perspective is also found in Minsky (1986)[p.154]. In contrast, most models in the con-
temporary post Keynesian literature take top managerial pay as a deduction from the
total wage bill. The division of the wage bill into top management pay and the rest
is determined by an exogenously given wage premium in some models (Palley, 2005,
Lavoie, 2009, Dutt, 2013)8 or affected by the state of the economy (utilization or em-
3There are many studies that show that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is
well below unity, including Antra`s (2004), Chirinko (2008).
4There has been a long debate on the specification of investment behavior in the post Keyne-
sian/structuralist literature. For the literature, see Skott (2012), Hein et al. (2012)
5Piketty’s conflation of financial wealth and physical capital has been often criticized. See, for
instance, Rowthorn (2014) and Galbraith (2014).
6Also see Samuelson and Modigliani (1966), Darity (1981) and Fazi and Salvadori (1985) as well as
numerous papers in Panico and Salvadori (1993) for the properties of two-class economies.
7The conventional measure of the factor share has exhibited little variations in the U.S. This obser-
vation is often used to dismiss the significance of the functional distribution of income for understanding
increasing income inequality. See Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008) for instance. Once the definition of
the profit share is expanded, a notable upward in the profit share can be found since the early 1980s
in the U.S economy.
8Lavoie (2009) examines the short-run effect of an increase in managerial costs in a Kaleckian model
with target return pricing and shows the effect depends on whether the actual utilization rate is greater
or lower than the standard rate of utilization. The present paper, however, analyzes the long-run effect
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ployment rates) in others (Palley, 2013b, 2014, 2015, Tavani and Vasudevan, 2014).9
The underlying framework of most models is predominantly Kaleckian where distri-
butional changes can shift the long-run utilization rate permanently (Palley (2013b)’s
Kaldorian analysis is an exception). The perspective of taking top management income
as an allocation of profits, as I will show, converts an otherwise-symmetric structure
of two groups of households into one of the economies which have properties similar
to those of Cambridge two-class economies: the movement of the income of the upper
class households is closely aligned with the movement of the (expanded) profit share,
while that of the rest with the movement of the wage share. Based on this feature, the
upper class and the rest will be identified with ‘capitalists’ and ‘workers’ respectively
throughout this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of a corporate
economy with two classes. Section 3 highlights the close relation between the functional
and the social distribution of income. Section 4 presents main analytic results regarding
the determination of income and wealth distribution. Section 5 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 A model of a corporate economy with two social
classes
The economy is assumed to be closed and thus various open economy complications
are left out. The role of government is limited to setting the real interest rate at a
constant level r with fiscal dimensions being assumed away. The labor force grows at
a constant rate n. The introduction of exogenous technical progress is straightforward,
but I assume the absence of technical progress throughout.
The long-run output-capital ratio is taken as exogenous, reflecting limited factor
substitutability and a Harrodian long-run requirement that actual utilization remains
at a structurally determined desired rate:
Y
K
= u∗ (1)
where Y = aggregate output; K = aggregate capital stock. On steady growth paths,
the growth rates of output and capital are equal to the natural rate:
Kˆ = Yˆ = n (2)
of managerial pay on income and wealth distribution under the assumption that utilization remains
at the desired rate throughout.
9The neo-Kaleckian three-class model in Palley (2015) is more complicated. CEO/top managerial
pay is a fraction of profits with the profit share itself exogenously determined by the degree of monopoly.
The wage bill division between middle managers and workers, however, depends on the employment
rate for workers. More specifically, a tight market condition for workers squeezes the middle managers’
share of the total wage bill with keeping the profit share intact.
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where a hat over a variable refers to its growth rate.
Kaldor (1955/56, 1957) argued that the adjustment of income distribution, by mak-
ing the aggregate saving rate endogenous, brings the warranted growth path into the
line with the natural growth rate, but, curiously enough, he presented his ‘Keynesian
theory of distribution’ based on the assumption of full employment. Kaldor (1959) later
tried to justify the curious assumption but it would be fair to say he did not succeed
and could not provide any unified theory that convincingly links his ‘Keynesian theory
of distribution’ to the determination of employment. I do not assume full employment
in this paper: the applicability of the Kaldorian distributional mechanism is not limited
to the state of full employment. Note that the steady growth assumption (2) does not
imply full employment but only a constant employment rate (under exogenous technical
progress), while the level of the employment rate is left undetermined.
There are at least two approaches that try to fill the lacuna in the Kaldor’s theory.
First, Skott (1989, 2012) introduces, along with a Harrodian investment function, the
output expansion function that connects firms’ pricing and production decisions to the
state of labor market as well as the demand condition in the goods market.10 Skott
shows how Harrodian investment behavior creates instability in the goods market and
the feedback from the labor market turns the instability into the bounded fluctuations
of the utilization and the accumulation rates around the desired utilization rate and the
natural rate of growth, respectively. The focus on steady growth in this paper – (1) and
(2) – can be justified if the long-run average values of actual utilization and growth rates
are approximately equal to u∗ and n over the course of cyclical fluctuations.11 It should
be noted that full employment does not follow from this framework: product market
equilibrium and firms’ decision to expand production jointly determine the employment
rate.
Second, Palley (2013b) has recently proposed a Kaldorian model where the feedback
from the labor market works through the technical progress function: an increase in
the employment rate speeds up labor-saving technical progress as firms may have a
strong incentive to innovate when labor is scarce. In addition, Palley assumes that
the employment rate negatively affects aggregate saving: the unemployment rate may
proxy for uncertainty and an increase in the unemployment rate thus leads to more
precautionary saving. Given this structure, the steady state employment rate will
be determined by the demand side as well as by the technical progress function. In
the present paper, there is no technical progress and therefore the implications of the
10Formally, Skott consider the output expansion function Yˆ = h(pi, e) with hpi > 0 and he ≤ 0.
Favorable demand conditions in the product market (high profit share pi) will tend to speed up output
expansion whereas tight labor market conditions (high employment rate e) constrain output expansion.
A behavioral foundation of the specification is discussed in Skott (1989) in detail.
11It should be noted that a steady growth path may not even exist: some parameter configurations,
along with a particular shape of the output expansion function, may not adimit steady growth in the
capitalist economy.
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Kaldorian distribution mechanism are independent of the issues regarding technical
progress.
2.1 Firms’ financial decisions and managerial pay
The firms’ budget constraint is written as
pI +Ww +Wc +Div + iM = pY + vN˙ + M˙ (3)
where p is the price of output, I real investment, Ww wages to workers, Wc top man-
agerial pay, Div dividends, i the nominal interest rate, M bank loans, Y real output, v
the unit price of stocks, and N the number of stocks. A dot over a variable refers to the
time derivative of the variable. Equation (3) shows that the firms’ sources of funds are
sales revenue, nets equity issues and borrowing, out of which firms finance investment
and pay wages to top managers and workers, dividends to shareholders, and interest on
bank loans.
Firms play a central role in the distribution of national income into its different
components. The excess of total revenue over wages to workers becomes gross profits
Π:
Π = pY −Ww (4)
or alternatively
Ww = (1− pi)pY (5)
where pi is the profit share, i.e., the ratio of gross profits to total revenue pi ≡ Π/(pY ).
As stressed in the introductory section, I treat the labor income of the top income
class as an allocation of profits. This approach implies that the definition of profits Π
in this paper is broader than that of measured profits based on national accounts where
CEO/managerial pay is registered as wages rather than profits.
Firms are assumed to pay a constant fraction λ of profits – net of depreciation and
interest payments – to top managers as salaries and bonus.
Wc = λ(Π− δpK − rM) (6)
The recent evidence that shows the increasing importance of labor income in the top
income class (Piketty and Saez, 2003, Mohun, 2006, Bivens and Mishel, 2013) may well
be captured by an increase in λ.
The rest of surplus is broken into dividends and retained earnings
Div = (1− sf )(1− λ)(Π− δpK − rM) (7)
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where sf is the retention rate.
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In addition to the retention/dividend payout policy, firms make decision on equity
financing policy. The equity issue policy is captured by an exogenous parameter, Nˆ ,
the growth rate of the number of stocks. Nˆ can be either positive or negative (or zero).
A negative value of Nˆ means the net acquisition of stocks by the firm sector from
households (stock buybacks).
2.2 Banks
The banking sector is modeled following an endogenous money perspective. Banks set
the real interest rate on loans at r. Banks make loans to firms and accept deposits from
households. I assume that the rate of interest on loans equals that on deposits, banks
do not hold any other asset than loans, nobody holds cash, and banking does not incur
costs other than the interest payments on depositors. Given these assumptions, banks
do not make pure profits, their net worth equals zero, and the amount of loans granted
then will return to the banking sector as deposits. The banking sector will be fully
described by the exogenous real interest rate r and the following balance sheet relation:
M = Mc +Mw (8)
where Mc and Mw are the level of deposits held by capitalists and workers, respectively.
2.3 Capitalists and workers
Capitalists receive managerial compensation Wc as well as dividends Divc and interest
income iMc and use their income to purchase consumer goods pCc and acquire stocks
and deposits, vN˙c and M˙c:
pCc + vN˙c + M˙c = Wc +Divc + iMc (9)
The workers’ budget constraint can be written analogously as:
pCw + vN˙w + M˙w = Ww +Divw + iMw (10)
The stock market clearing condition13 is given by
N = Nc +Nw (11)
12The interest payments in the firms’ decision on managerial pay and dividend payout, (6) and (7),
are evaluated at the (exogenous) real interest rate. Household interest incomes (17) as a determinant
of their saving/portfolio decisions are also valued at the real interest rate. Given these specifications,
household consumption is not influenced by inflation. If the nominal rate is used to evaluate them
instead, consumption will be affected by gains or losses from inflation under the assumption of the
constant real interest rate, which will make the analysis unnecessarily complicated.
13The role of the stock market for steady state equilibrium is discussed in Appendix.
7
Each class receives dividends from firms in proportion to their share of stock ownership.
Let us denote the capitalist share of stocks as
k ≡ Nc
N
. (12)
Total dividend income is distributed to two classes accordingly:
Divc = k ·Div = k(1− sf )(1− λ)(Π− δpK − rM) (13)
Divw = (1− k) ·Div = (1− k)(1− sf )(1− λ)(Π− δpK − rM) (14)
Households’ saving/portfolio behavior is specified in terms of their desired stock-flow
ratios, as in Skott (1981, 1989) and Skott and Ryoo (2008):
vNj = αjpYj (15)
Mj = βjpYj, j = c, w (16)
where Yj’s (j = c, w) are capitalist and workers’ real income, i.e.,
Yj = (Wj +Divj + rMj)/p (17)
and αj’s and βj’s are the ratios of stock and deposit holdings to income that each class
desires to achieve, respectively. It is assumed that these ratios are attained in steady
growth. The desired stock-flow ratios may depend on a number of variables such as
the rates of return on various assets and the level and the growth rate of incomes, but
comparative statics are particularly simple and transparent if those ratios are taken as
exogenous. The results with exogenous stock-flow ratios will carry over to the general
case with variable ratios if the effects from induced changes in the ratios are relatively
small.14 I will assume that αj’s and βj’s are exogenous throughout this paper, leaving
the cases with endogenous stock-flow ratios for a future study. Another advantage of
this approach is that the data on stock-flow ratios are readily obtained from the balance
sheets and income data, although the availability of the data on the types of stock-flow
ratios relevant for particular theoretical and empirical purposes may vary from case to
case.
Given the workers’ and capitalists’ stock-flow ratios, the aggregate wealth-income
ratio will be determined by the stock-flow ratios and the income distribution between
workers and capitalists:
vN +M
pY
=
∑
j=w,c
vNj +Mj
pY
=
∑
j=w,c
(αj + βj)
Yj
Y
(18)
14Skott (1981, 1989) introduced the stock-flow specification of saving/portfolio behavior. Skott and
Ryoo (2008) apply this approach to the study of financialization and find that the effects of financial
changes on macroeconomic performance through induced changes in the ratios are small in various
models including Lavoie and Godley (2001/02) and Godley and Lavoie (2007).
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As shown later, income distribution is endogenously determined by a number of factors,
including firms’ financial behavior, the share of managerial pay, households’ saving
behavior and the natural rate of growth. The aggregate wealth-income ratio will be
influenced by them, accordingly.
The stock-flow ratios (15) and (16) have immediate implications for consumption
behavior. Together with the budget constraints (9) and (10), they can be used to
derive steady-growth consumption functions. On a steady growth path, the share of
stock ownership k is constant and, therefore, the growth rates of the number of stocks
owned by each class should be uniform: Nˆc = Nˆw = Nˆ . A steady state also requires
the respective income share of workers and capitalists to be constant. Moreover, the
growth rate of real income Yc and Yw should be the same as the natural rate of growth
n, i.e., Yˆc = Yˆw = n. Given these requirements, (15), (16), (9), (10) and (17) yield
steady-growth consumption functions for workers and capitalists:
Cj = (1− αjNˆ − βjn)Yj, j = c, w (19)
The specific form of the consumption functions has a straightforward interpretation.
Household savings take the form of newly acquired financial assets. Since the financial
stock-flow ratios are constant along steady-growth paths, the ratio of newly purchased
stocks to household income is fully determined by the product of the rate of new issues of
equity by firms and the stocks/income ratio, αjNˆ , and that of newly acquired deposits
is by the product of the steady-growth rate of deposits and the deposits/income ratio,
βjn. The sum of αjNˆ and βjn can be interpreted as the saving rate of class j, i.e.,
sj ≡ αjNˆ + βjn.15 Using this short-hand notation, the consumption functions can be
rewritten as
Cj = (1− sj)Yj j = c, w (20)
Empirical studies show that the rich have saving rates typically higher than the poor
(Carroll, 1998) and I will assume sc > sw
16. It should be noted, however, that the as-
sumption is not always necessary for the Kaldorian analysis when there exists corporate
saving.17
It will be convenient to introduce some additional notations. The sum of top man-
agement pay and dividends of capitalist households is proportional to the profits net of
depreciation and firms’ interest payments:
Wc +Divc = [λ+ (1− sf )(1− λ)k](Π− δpK − rM)
15This should not be confused with short-run saving rates. The definition of sj is based on steady-
state assumptions.
16Using the definition of sc and sw, the assumption sc > sw implies a restriction that αcNˆ + βcn >
αwNˆ + βwn.
17One may recall that Kaldor’s original justification for high saving out of profits was based on the
existence of corporate saving, rather than the difference in personal saving rates between capitalists
and workers (Kaldor, 1955/56, 1966).
9
Let us define
a(k) ≡ λ+ (1− sf )(1− λ)k (21)
a(k) represents the fraction of net profits that are distributed to capitalist households
in the form of managerial pay and dividends. a(k) refers to the capitalist share of
(net) profits. The capitalist share of profits is positively related to their share of stock
ownership k. It is increasing in the share of managerial pay in net profits λ and
decreasing in the firms’ retention rate.
Next consider the sum of top management pay and total dividends:
Wc +Divc +Divw = [λ+ (1− sf )(1− λ)](Π− δpK − rM)
= [1− sf (1− λ)](Π− δpK − rM)
The term 1−sf (1−λ) can be seen as the firms’ gross payout ratio (including managerial
pay). I will call sf (1− λ) the effective retention rate and denote it as
s∗f ≡ sf (1− λ). (22)
3 Functional and social distribution of income
Note that the two types of households introduced in the previous section are symmetric
except the treatment of the labor income of one class as an allocation of profits. It
is this treatment that breaks the symmetry of two classes. This section shows that
treating the labor income of one class as an allocation of profits produces the close
alignment between functional income distribution (the respective shares of profits and
wages, pi) and social distribution of income (income claims of social classes, i.e., Yc and
Yw)., thereby making the economy akin to Kaldor/Pasinetti-type economies.
For a given state of functional income distribution and stock ownership (pi and k),
there exists a unique level of income for each class yc and yw that is consistent with
given deposit-income ratios βc and βw where yc ≡ Yc/K and yw ≡ Yw/K.18. Using (5)–
(6), (8) and (13)–(17), after appropriate substitution and normalization, the (unique)
mapping from the profit share to the distributive shares of capitalists and workers can
be written as (see Appendix):
yc(pin, k) =
a(k)(pin − βwr)un
a(k)(βc − βw)r + (1− βcr)(1− s∗fβwr)
(23)
yw(pin, k) =
[(1− βcr)(1− s∗fpin)− a(k)(pin − βcr)]un
a(k)(βc − βw)r + (1− βcr)(1− s∗fβwr)
(24)
where un is net output, un ≡ u∗ − δ, and pin is the share of net profit in net output,
pin ≡ piu∗−δu∗−δ . It is readily seen from (23) and (24) that the capitalist income is increasing
18All real variables will be normalized by K and all nominal variables by pK from now on.
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but the workers’ income is decreasing in the net profit share.19 The positive effect of
changes in the profit share on the capitalist income comes primarily from increases in
managerial pay and dividend income.
An increase in the profit share reduces wages for workers but this reduction in
income will be partially compensated by an increase in dividends. The overall effect
will be negative but the precise magnitude depends on the required adjustments in
deposit holdings (and the level of firms’ debt).
It is also clear from (23) and (24) that a shift in stock ownership toward capitalists,
a rise in k, increases the capitalists’ income share but decreases the workers’ share.
With the profit share and the share of stock ownership given, the capitalist and
workers’ incomes are influenced by changes in the firm’s retention policy, the share of
managerial compensation, the real interest rate, and household saving behavior reflected
in βj’s. Changes in the income of the classes in turn affect aggregate demand, which
generates induced changes in the profit share as well as the state of stock ownership.
The next section turns to how the profit share and the distribution of income and wealth
between the two classes are determined endogenously by the parameters of the model.
4 Aggregate demand and distribution
The condition for the equilibrium in the goods market is given by
(1− sc)yc(pin, k) + (1− sw)yw(pin, k) + n = un (25)
where sj ≡ αjNˆ+βjn. The profit share adjusts to clear the goods market. The stability
of the adjustment process will be ensured if the level of aggregate demand is decreasing
in the profit share. The required condition is given by
(1− sc) ∂yc
∂pin
+ (1− sw)∂yw
∂pin
< 0 (26)
i.e., the increase in capitalist consumption caused by a marginal increase in the profit
share does not fully compensate for the reduction of the workers’ consumption. Using
(23) and (24), condition (26) can be rewritten as
(sc − sw)a(k) + (1− sw)(1− βcr)s∗f > 0 (27)
The assumption sc ≥ sw is sufficient for this condition to be met. Under condition (26),
substituting (23) and (24) in (25) and solving the result for pin gives us the equilibrium
19The denominator of the expressions is positive for all plausible values.
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profit share for any given level of k20:
pi∗n(k) =
(ι− sw)[a(k)(βc − βw)r + (1− βcr)(1− s∗fβwr)]
(sc − sw)a(k) + (1− sw)(1− βcr)s∗f
+ βwr (28)
where ι is the share of net investment in net output, ι ≡ n/un. Once the Kaldorian
mechanism determines the equilibrium profit share for a given state of stock ownership
distribution (k) via equation (28), the division of income between capitalists and workers
is also determined as a function of k. Substituting (28) back into (23) and (24) gives
us:
yc(pi
∗
n(k), k) =
a(k)(ι− sw)un
(sc − sw)a(k) + (1− sw)(1− βcr)s∗f
(29)
yw(pi
∗
n(k), k) =
[a(k)(sc − ι) + (1− ι)(1− βcr)s∗f ]un
(sc − sw)a(k) + (1− sw)(1− βcr)s∗f
(30)
The capitalists ’ income (29) will be strictly positive if and only if
ι > sw, (31)
i.e., the workers’ saving rate should not be too large. If the condition is violated, the
equilibrium profit share will be too low, the capitalists’ income will vanish. This is the
familiar viability condition for a two-class economy in the Pasinetti model (Pasinetti,
1962, Samuelson and Modigliani, 1966).
The workers’ income (30), on the other hand, will be positive for all possible states
of stock ownership distribution if
a(1)(sc − ι) + (1− ι)(1− βcr)s∗f > 0. (32)
Note that the workers’ income (30) decreases as the capitalists’ share of stocks (k) rises.
If the workers’ income is positive when all stocks are owned by capitalists (k = 1), then
it will be positive for any other k ∈ [0, 1], too.
Assuming (31) and (32) are met and denoting as x the ratio of the capitalists’ to
the workers’ income (the degree of income inequality), equations (29) and (30) give us
20(28) is a generalized version of the Cambridge equation. If the workers’ propensity to save is zero
(i.e., αw = βw = 0) and the expression (28) is reduced to a simple version of the Cambridge equation,
i.e., the profit rate is determined by the growth rate divided by the saving propensity out of profits:
ρn ≡ piu∗ − δ = n
s∗pi
where s∗pi ≡ [s∗f (1 − βcr) + (1 − s∗f )(αcNˆ + βcn)]/(1 − s∗fβcr). Note that s∗pi is affected by s∗f , Nˆ , αc,
βc, r and n.
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one relation between income and wealth distribution
x ≡ yc(pi
∗
n(k), k)
yw(pi∗n(k), k)
=
(ι− sw)a(k)
(sc − ι)a(k) + (1− ι)(1− βcr)s∗f
≡ F (k;λ, sf , Nˆ , αc, αw, βc, βw, n, r, u∗) (33)
Equation (33) shows that the degree of income inequality depends on inequality in
stock ownership and a number of parameters in this model. A shift in stock ownership
toward capitalists raises their income share relative to workers by increasing their share
of dividend income, i.e., F ′(k) > 0.
The other relation between x and k is given by ownership equilibrium. Using the
definition of k and αj’s:
k =
vNc
vNc + vNw
=
αcpYc
αcpYc + αwpYw
=
αc
αw
x
αc
αw
x+ 1
≡ G
(
x;
αc
αw
)
(34)
The capitalists’ share of stocks is uniquely determined by income distribution between
classes. Given the constant stocks/income ratios αc and αw, an increase in the capi-
talists’ income relative to workers raises the capitalists’ stock holdings relative to the
workers’ stocks, i.e., G′(x) > 0.
On any steady growth path, the two relations (33) and (34) must be mutually
consistent. The steady growth value of the capitalist share of stocks is the fixed point
of G(F (k)), i.e.,
k∗ = G(F (k∗)). (35)
Appendix shows that there exists a unique solution k∗ ∈ (0, 1) under the assump-
tions (31) and (32).
The solution for k then fully determines the profit share as well as the income
distribution between workers and capitalists via (28) and (33). The capitalists’ share
of wealth is also easily obtained using (15) and (16):
vNc +Mc
vNc +Mc + vNw +Mw
=
(αc + βc)x
∗
(αc + βc)x∗ + (αw + βw)
. (36)
The expression (36) shows that for given stock-flow ratios, any factor that increases
income inequality x∗ will also raise wealth inequality.
Figure 1 illustrates the determination of income distribution and stock ownership in
the steady state. The FF curve – ‘income distribution curve’ – depicts the level of the
workers’ income relative to capitalists’ determined by the Kaldorian mechanism for each
state of stock ownership, equation (33). The GG curve – ‘stock ownership distribution
curve’ – represents the distribution of stock ownership implied by desired stock-income
ratios at each state of income distribution, equation (34). Given the functional form of
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Figure 1: Income distribution and stock ownership in the steady state
(33) and (34) and assumptions (31) and (32), the stock-ownership distribution curve
GG is steeper than the income distribution curve FF at the intersection (see Appendix).
Macroeconomic implications of parametric changes for income and wealth distribu-
tion can be readily derived. A visual inspection of (33) and (34) reveals that sf , λ, Nˆ ,
βc and βw and n shifts only the income distribution curve FF whereas stocks/income
ratios αc and αw affect both curves. Comparative statics regarding αc and αw result in
various cases depending on the pattens of the shift in both relations.
Formally, the long-run effects of any parameter z ∈ {sf , λ, Nˆ , βc, βw, n, αc, αw} on
equilibrium income and stock-ownership distribution x∗ and k∗ are represented by
dx∗
dz
=
∂F
∂z
+ F ′(k∗)∂G
∂z
1− F ′(k∗)G′(x∗) (37)
dk∗
dz
=
∂G
∂z
+G′(x∗)∂F
∂z
1− F ′(k∗)G′(x∗) (38)
The denominator is always positive because the income distribution curve (FF ) is
flatter than the stock-ownership distribution curve (GG). Therefore, for the parameters
that only shifts the income distribution curve FF (i.e., sf , λ, Nˆ , βc and βw and n),
the sign of dx
∗
dz
and dk
∗
dz
immediately follows that of ∂F
∂z
because ∂G
∂z
= 0. In other words,
any factor that increases the capitalists’ share of income for a given k will shift up the
income distribution curve from FF 0 to FF 1. In the new steady state E1 the capitalists’
share of income and wealth both will increase (see Figure 2). The effect on the income
distribution curve of those parameters are as follows:
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Figure 2: Parametric shift in favor of the capitalist share of income for a given state of
stock-ownership distribution (a rise in λ and n; a fall in sf , Nˆ and βw)
A shift of power relations in corporations in favor of top managerial pay, a
rise in λ, raises the capitalists’ share of income and wealth:
∂F
∂λ
=
sf (1− ι)(1− βcr)x∗2
(ι− sw)a(k∗)2 > 0
An increase in λ represents a structural shift of power relations in corporations in favor
of CEO/managerial pay. For a given profit share, such an increase in λ reduces retained
earnings as well as dividend incomes. The workers’ income decreases due to the reduced
dividends, but the capitalists’ income will increase as the increase in managerial pay
more than offsets the decline in dividend income. The initial impact effect that favors
capitalists may be reinforced or partially offset by an endogenous increase or decrease
in the profit share. One may expect that given the capitalists’ saving rate higher than
the workers’ the initial shift of income distribution in favor of capitalists must reduce
consumption demand and the equilibrium profit share. This reasoning is not always
valid, however. The reduction in retained earnings due to a rise in the executives’ claim
on profits means that the increase in the capitalists’ income must be larger than the
reduced amount of the workers’ income.21 The overall effect on aggregate demand for a
given profit share will be ambiguous, but under plausible parameter values an increase
in consumption demand is a possible outcome and the equilibrium profit share can
increase.22
21Note that yf + yc + yw = un where yf is the retained earnings scaled by capital stock.
22In a corporate economy with retained earnings, a rise in λ represents an income transfer away from
the corporate sector, making the income transfer from capitalist households to workers a positive-sum
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The general lesson is that the existence of retained earnings in corporate economies
tends to reinforce the initial distributional impact of a structural shift in favor of top
management. As the above partial derivative confirms, the capitalists’ income share
will be higher for a given k unambiguously after the endogenous adjustment of the profit
share. The increase in the capitalists’ share of income shifts stock ownership toward
capitalists for given desired stock-flow ratios. The adjustment of the distribution of
stocks – the rise in k – redistributes dividend incomes in favor of capitalists and further
increases their income share. The capitalist share of income and stocks thus will be
higher in the new steady state.
There are a number of studies on financialization, including (Epstein, 2005, Stock-
hammer, 2004, Skott and Ryoo, 2008, van Treeck, 2009, Hein, 2012, Palley, 2013a).
Among many developments associated with financialization, the retention rate of non-
financial corporations in the US decreased significantly in recent decades: the U.S.
corporations have paid out the greater portion of their earnings to their shareholders
in the recent decades. The rate of net equity issues by non-financial corporations was
small but positive on average in the 1950s and 1960s, but the figures turned to large
negative numbers since the early 1980s. In other words, an increasing part of corpo-
rate earnings has been distributed to shareholders in the form of stock buybacks in
the recent decades. The following results show that a fall in sf and Nˆ unambiguously
increases the capitalists’ share of income and wealth.
A fall in the retention rate (sf) raises the capitalists’ share of income and
wealth:
∂F
∂sf
= −(1− λ)[λ+ (1− λ)k
∗](1− ι)(1− βcr)x∗2
(ι− sw)a(k∗)2 < 0
An increase in the dividend payout to households – a fall in sf – raises consumption
and aggregate demand for a given profit share (and k). The product market equilibrium
requires the profit share to rise to eliminate excess demand. The endogenous increase
in the profit share raises the capitalists’ income relative to the workers’ income. The
capitalists’ income share increases and the resulting increase in their share of stock
holdings strengthens the impact effect. In the new steady state, the capitalists’ share
of income and wealth will be higher.
An increase in stock buybacks – a fall in the rate of net equity issues (Nˆ) –
increases the capitalists’ share of income and wealth:
∂F
∂Nˆ
= − αcx
∗2
(ι− sw)k∗ < 0
transfer: for any given profit share the rise in λ must raise the capitalists’ income more than the
reduced amount of the workers’ income. Therefore the rise in λ can increase aggregate demand for a
given profit share.
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An increase in stock buybacks can be captured by a decline in the rate of equity issue
by firms (Nˆ). A fall in Nˆ decreases the saving rates sj ≡ αjNˆ + βjn by reducing the
fraction of the household income devoted to the acquisition of newly issued stocks is
αjNˆ on a steady growth path. Consumption demand by both classes will increase and
an increase in the profit share is required to maintain the product market equilibrium.
The change in the functional distribution of income will shift income and wealth from
workers to capitalists.
A reduction in the long-run growth rate (n) reduces the capitalists’ share
of income and wealth:
∂F
∂n
=
x∗
(ι− sw)y∗w
(1− βwy∗w − βcy∗c ) > 0 if 1− βwy∗w − βcy∗c > 0
It is straightforward to see that a fall in n reduces the left-hand side of (25) – aggregate
demand – directly by bring down steady-growth investment demand relative to capital
stock. The fall in n, however, decreases the saving rates of capitalists and workers by
reducing their net acquisition of deposits, thereby affecting aggregate demand positively.
The former effect will outweigh the latter unambiguously as long as the firms’ debt-
capital ratio is below unity: since M
pK
= βcyc + βwyw, the effect of a change in n on the
left-hand side of (25) can be written as
−∂sc
∂n
· yc − ∂sc
∂n
· yw + 1 = −(βcyc + βwyw) + 1 = 1− M
pK
> 0
if M/pK < 1. A reduction in the natural rate of growth therefore leads to a net
decrease in aggregate demand relative to normal capacity output and causes the equi-
librium profit share to fall for any k. Lower growth thus shifts the income distribution
curve downward. The capitalists’ share of income and wealth will decrease. Note that
this result is opposite to Piketty’s argument that low growth is a source of increasing
inequality. Piketty’s explanation is based on the assumption that, with the aggregate
saving rate taken as constant, product market equilibrium is attained through the ad-
justment of the capital-output ratio (1/u in our framework) in response to an exogenous
change in n. Given his Solow-Swan framework, a fall in n raises K/Y which, under per-
fect competition, raises the profit share if the elasticity of factor substitution is greater
than unity. The Kaldorian framework here is very different. I have taken K/Y as
exogenous and the aggregate saving rate is endogenous. The endogenous adjustment of
the aggregate saving rate comes through the adjustment of income distribution. A fall
in n requires the aggregate saving rate to fall, which takes place through a fall in the
profit share. In this Kaldorian framewor, the reasons for increasing inequality therefore
should be found somewhere else rather than the fall in the natural rate.
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A fall in the workers’ deposits/income ratio (βw) raises the capitalists’ in-
come and wealth shares.
∂F
∂βw
= − nx
∗
ι− sw < 0
The effect of changes in interest bearing assets or liabilities on aggregate demand is
typically ambiguous in post Keynesian models with differential saving rates of two
classes. The ambiguous long-run effect on aggregate demand of a rise in the workers’
indebtedness, for instance, appears in Dutt (2006), Palley (2010), Ryoo and Kim (2014).
The same kind of ambiguity also characterizes the present model: for a given k, the
effect of βj’s on the profit share are ambiguous. A fall in βw, for example, tends to
decrease aggregate demand through a transfer of interest income away from workers
who have a low saving rate, but it can stimulate aggregate demand by reducing the
workers’ saving rate. To understand the latter, recall that sw ≡ αwNˆ + βwn: a fall in
βw means a decline in the workers’ net acquisition of deposits (or an increase in net
borrowing) and thus a fall in the saving rate. The effect on aggregate demand and the
profit share can be either way for a given k and the induced effect coming from the
adjustment of k further complicates the net outcome.
Interestingly, in spite of the ambiguity regarding the effect on demand and functional
distribution, the effect of changes in βw on the class-share of income and wealth (x
∗
and k∗) is clear-cut: a decline in the workers’ deposits/income ratio – or an increase
in the workers’ debt/income ratio – reduces the workers’ income relative to capitalists
unambiguously. A fall in βw creates a transfer of interest income away from workers
(or increases the burden of debt service if the fall in βw primarily reflects an increase
in debt/income ratio) for a given profit share. The impact negative effect of a fall in
βw on the workers’ share of income is strong enough and cannot be overturned by the
derived effect from changes in the profit share, as the above partial derivative confirms.
The distribution curve FF will shift upward unambiguously, which raises the steady
state values of the capitalists’ share of income and wealth.23
The effect of changes in the stock-income ratio (αc and αw): distributional
implications of the stock market boom in the 1990s Changes in stocks/income
ratios shift both the income distribution and the stock-ownership distribution curves.
In addition, the effect of αj on the capitalists’ income share for a given k depends on
the sign of the rate of equity issues:
∂F
∂αc
= − Nˆx
∗2
ι− sw > 0 if Nˆ < 0 (39)
23The effect on x of changes in the capitalists’ deposits/income ratio (βc) is ambiguous even for a
given k, however:
∂F
∂βc
= − [(1− ι)s
∗
fr − na(k∗)]x∗2
(ι− sw)a(k∗) R 0
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∂F
∂αw
= − Nˆx
∗
ι− sw if Nˆ < 0 (40)
When the rate of net equity issues is positive Nˆ > 0, a higher stocks/income ratio means
a higher saving rate and depresses effective demand for a given pi and k. The profit
share pi must decrease to maintain the product market equilibrium, which will reduce
the capitalists’ share of income for a given k. When Nˆ < 0, however, keeping the ratio
of stocks to income at a higher value implies a lower saving rate, thereby leaving more
income for consumption. The profit share required for the product market equilibrium
for a given k increases as a result and so does the capitalists’ share of income. The
effect of changes in αj on demand and the profit share will be neutral if Nˆ = 0.
24. As
pointed out already, the average value of Nˆ was nearly zero during the Golden Age of
Capitalism, but has been negative substantially since the early 1980s due to the surges
in stock buybacks. Thus for our purpose, the case of Nˆ < 0 is of particular interest.25
The stock market boom, in the 1990s, can be captured by large increases in αc and αw
under the condition Nˆ < 0. In the present model, such a development boosts aggregate
demand for a given profit share and the increase in effective demand must raise the
profit share and the capitalist share of income for a given state of equity distribution
between classes. The income distribution curve, the FF curve, therefore will shift
upward. The final outcome depends on how the GG curve is affected. Interestingly,
the recent data by Saez and Zucman (2014) implies that αc/αw, the only factor that
determines the position of the GG curve, has exhibited little variation since the early
1980s.26 Thus the qualitative effect may well be approximated by Figure 2. The stock
market boom in the 1990s therefore appears to have contributed to increasing share of
capitalists’ income and wealth.
5 Conclusion
The Kaldorian perspective in this paper places corporate firms at the center of the
process of income distribution. A pillar of the Kaldorian distribution mechanism is
24The dependence of the effect of changes in stocks/income ratios on demand has long been recog-
nized since Skott (1981, 1989).
25Increasing stock buybacks and stocks/income ratios may reinforce each other and create a positive
feedback. Stock repurchases by corporations tend to raise stock prices and create capital gains and
the rate of return on stocks. This in turn justifies the households’ attempt to raise the level of stock
holdings relative to their income. The resulting increase in aggregate demand and profitability relaxes
the firms’ budget constraint, which validates the firms’ lax financial practices (stock buybacks). I
explored how such a positive feedback can generate ‘Minskian long waves’ in Ryoo (2010, 2013a,b).
26Using the data in Saez and Zucman (2014), a ballpark estimate of αc/αw in the period since the
1980s is the order of 10 if the capitalist class in this model can be identified with the top 1% class.
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the perspective that wage contracts are written in the nominal term and the normal
functioning of labor market is not characterized by real wage bargaining.27 Under this
condition, favorable demand conditions in the goods market permit firms to achieve
higher profit margins through pricing. Using Minsky’s expression, prices in the cap-
italist economy are the ‘carriers of profits’. Firms play a pivotal role in determining
the functional distribution of income via their pricing behavior. In addition to the role
of firms in determining the functional distribution of income through pricing, corpo-
rations influence the division of aggregate income into corporate saving and personal
income. Outside the Modigliani-Miller world, changes in the corporate saving rate
– their retention/payout policies – and equity issue policies have strong implications
for the state of effective demand. I have suggested that the corporate decisions over
CEO/managerial compensations can be viewed as part of firms’ saving decisions, i.e.,
the decision on the effective retention rate. An increase in an allocation of profits
to top management pay amounts to a reduction in the effective retention rate and
increase total household income. Therefore its effect on aggregate demand is not nec-
essarily contractionary although the capitalists’ households have a saving propensity
higher than workers. The structural shift in the power relation within corporations in
favor of top management pay unambiguously increases the capitalists’ share of income
and wealth in our framework. Perhaps more importantly, the effect is reinforced by
the other structural/behavioral changes. A reduction in the firms’ retention rate tends
to increase aggregate demand and the profit share, which in the end leads to a rise in
the capitalists’ share of income and wealth. Corporate decisions on equity issues also
affect aggregate demand and income distribution by influencing personal saving rates.
In corporate economies, saving does not usually take the form of direct ownership of
physical capital but the ownership of financial assets. Household saving in the form
of stocks can increase in so far as corporations provide positive net issues of equity in
aggregate. Since the 1980s, net new issues of equity have been substantially negative,
which has contributed to lower saving rates. This must have had a positive effect on
aggregate demand and profit margins.
Turning to the household side, the stock market boom in the 1990s created a strong
stimulus to aggregate demand under the condition that the greater portion of corpo-
rate stocks was retired in the form of stock buybacks, leading to the falling household
saving rate. Rising debt/income ratios of low-income households – a fall in βw – also
unambiguously raises the capitalists’ share of income and wealth in this model.
A fall in the natural growth rate, in contrast to Piketty’s argument (‘capital is back
because slow growth is back’), causes the capitalists’ share of income and wealth to fall
27In the General Theory, Keynes saw the assumption of real wage bargaining fundamental in the
classical theory of full employment. The lack of mechanisms or institutions in the capitalist economy
that can enforce into wage contracts real wages derived from workers’ intertemporal choices over
leisure/labor was a basis of Keynes’s rejection of the ‘second postulate’ of the classical theory of full
employment (Keynes, 1964[1936]).
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in this Kaldorian framework.
Overall, various structural and behavioral changes I have highlighted in this paper
– except the fall in the natural rate – appear to have exerted the forces that stretch
long-run aggregate demand upward. An increase in long-run aggregate demand, in a
Kaldorian model of this kind, translates into an increase in the share of profits and
the capitalists’ share of income and wealth.28 The Kaldorian perspective that stresses
the distributional consequences of aggregate demand has received little attention in the
existing literature: in most mainstream analyses, aggregate demand is irrelevant in the
long run; the majority of Kaleckian analyses are inclined to discover the stagnationary
effect of an exogenous increase in inequality on utilization and accumulation.
The collapse of the Golden Age has been often identified as the start of the transition
to a stagnationary phase that suffered from a chronic deficiency of aggregate demand.
Along this line, increasing income inequality is often viewed as one of the causes of low
aggregate demand and slow growth, primarily on the ground that the rich have lower
propensities to consume than the poor.29 The perspective presented here provides an
alternative hypothesis: increasing inequality may have been strongly induced by the
collapse of the structure that ensured the stability of demand generation during the
Golden Age. From this perspective, the Kaldorian distributional mechanism exerted
its force at the full strength after the end of the Golden Age: shifts in the power and the
behavioral relation that favored capitalist households tended to be validated through
their effects on aggregate demand and profit margins. There was a downward shift in
the long-run accumulation rate during the last three decades, but such a contractionary
force appears to have been even more than offset by the expansionary effects from the
other developments discussed above.
The analysis in this paper has many limitations. The analysis, first, has focused
primarily on the link between aggregate demand and distribution, but left out a detailed
analysis of the effects on the employment rate.30 Next, the focus of the analysis on
steady growth paths may be unsatisfactory especially from a Minskian perspective
of long waves (Minsky, 1964, 1995, Palley, 2011, Ryoo, 2010, 2013a,b): the long-run
movement of aggregate demand and distribution may be better described as subsequent
phases of endogenous long swings rather than the movement across steady growth paths.
The Minskian perspective brings to the fore the issues regarding the sustainability of a
28Booming asset markets increase realized capital gains and tend to amplify the underlying trend of
increasing income inequality.
29The popularity of the discourse on ‘wage-led growth’ seems to reflect such a perspective (Lavoie
and Stockhammer, 2013).
30In the Skott model, the employment rate is jointly determined by the profit share and the shape
and the position of the output expansion function. With the output expansion function given, a rise
in the profit share leads to an increase in the employment rate, but the assumption that the output
expansion function remains unchanged over the past decades is heroic. Institutional details and power
relations in the labor market as well as capitalist dynamism may have changed and affected the output
expansion function.
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prolonged upward stretch of aggregate demand and income inequality.31 The analysis,
third, has paid little attention to the issues of government policies.32 Finally, the
analysis has assumed that the economy is mature so that long-run growth is constrained
by the availability of labor, and therefore the results cannot be directly applicable to
Lewis-type dual economies.
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Appendix
Derivation of (23) and (24) Substituting (5), (6), (13) and (14) into (17), we then
obtain:
pYc = [λ+ k(1− sf )(1− λ)](Π− δK − rM) + rMc
pYw = (1− pi)pY + (1− k)(1− sf )(1− λ)](Π− δK − rM) + rMw
Using (8) and (16) and dividing through by pK, we get:
yc = [λ+ k(1− λ)(1− sf )][piu∗ − δ − r(βcyc + βwyw)] + rβcyc
yw = (1− pi)u∗ + (1− k)(1− λ)(1− sf )][piu∗ − δ − r(βcyc + βwyw)] + rβwyw
Defining a(k) ≡ λ+ k(1− λ)(1− sf ) and s∗f ≡ sf (1− λ), and rearranging the terms,(
1− βcr[1− a(k)] a(k)βwr
βcr[1− a(k)− s∗f ] 1− βwr[a(k) + s∗f ]
)(
yc
yw
)
=
(
a(k)(piu∗ − δ)
u∗ − δ − [a(k) + s∗f ](piu∗ − δ)
)
Solving the system of equations for yc and yw yields:
yc =
a(k)[piu∗ − δ − βwr(u∗ − δ)]
a(k)(βc − βw)r + (1− βcr)(1− s∗fβwr)
yw =
(1− βcr)[u∗ − δ − s∗f (piu∗ − δ)]− a(k)[piu∗ − δ − βcr(u∗ − δ)]
a(k)(βc − βw)r + (1− βcr)(1− s∗fβwr)
Applying the definitions un ≡ u∗ − δ and pin ≡ piu∗−δun results in (23) and (24).
Existence and uniqueness of the steady state Equation (34) can be rewritten
to x = αwk
αc(1−k) , which must be consistent with equation (33). We then have:
(ι− sw)a(k)
(sc − ι)a(k) + (1− ι)(1− βcr)s∗f
=
αwk
αc(1− k)
The solution to this equation can be found by looking at:
q(k) ≡ αc(1− k)(ι− sw)a(k)− αwk[(sc − ι)a(k) + (1− ι)(1− βcr)s∗f ] = 0
q(k) is continuous and quadratic in q and we have:
q(0) = αc(ι− sw)a(0) > 0 under condition (31)
q(1) = −αw[(sc − ι)a(1) + (1− ι)(1− βcr)s∗f ] < 0 under condition (32)
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By the intermediate value theorem, the continuity of q(k) ensures the existence of
k∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that q(k∗) = 0. The continuity of q(k) implies that there exist an
odd number of k∗’s in (0, 1). Since q(k) is quadratic in k, k∗ must be unique in (0, 1).
Because q(0) > 0 > q(1), q(k) must cut the k-axis from the above at k = k∗. In other
words, q′(k∗) < 0. It can be checked that q′(k∗) < 0 implies that G′(x∗)F ′(k∗) < 1: the
FF curve is flatter than the GG curve at the intersection as in Figure 1.
Equilibrium in asset markets There are two financial assets held by households
(stocks and deposits). Equilibrium in asset markets is represented by (8) and (11),
which, together with (15) and (16), implies that
vN = αcpYc + αwpYw (A1)
M = βcpYc + βwpYw (A2)
Condition (A2) has been already used for the derivation of (23) and (24) and there-
fore steady growth equilibrium (x∗, k∗) is consistent with condition (A2).
I have also used the stock market equilibrium condition (11) to establish steady
growth equilibrium (x∗, k∗), but the equilibrium in the stock market itself is achieved
through the adjustment of stock prices via (A1). It follows from (A1) that on the steady
growth path:
(v/p)∗ = (αcY ∗c + αwY
∗
w)/N = (αcy
∗
c + αwy
∗
w)K
∗/N∗
On the steady growth path, y∗c and y
∗
w are constant. Since the growth rate of N is
exogenously given by Nˆ and capital stock grows at n in steady growth equilibrium,
the steady growth path will be supported by a constant rate of real capital gains, i.e.,
(v/p)∗ will grow at n − Nˆ on the steady growth path. The role of stock prices here is
essentially the same as that of the valuation ratio (= vN/pK) in Kaldor (1966).
A stock-flow consistent feature of the model can be checked by inspecting the budget
constraints. Adding up (3), (9) and (10) and rearranging the terms, we have:
p(C + I − Y ) + v(N˙c + N˙w − N˙) = M˙ − M˙c − M˙w + i(Mc +Mw −M)
Stock-equilibrium (8) and (11) implies flow-equilibrium: M˙ = M˙c + M˙w and N˙ =
N˙c + N˙w. Thus asset markets clearing requires that C + I = Y , i.e., the equilibrium in
the product market.
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